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Abstract
We define a set of process algebra operators (controllers) that mimic the se-
curity automata introduced by Schneider in [18] and by Ligatti and al. in [4],
respectively. We also show how to automatically build these controllers for given
security policies.
1 Overview
Recently, several papers tackled the formal definition of mechanisms for enforcing
security policies (e.g., see [3, 4, 7, 12, 14, 18]).
The focus of this paper is the study of the enforcement mechanisms introduced by
Schneider in [18] and security automata developed by Ligatti and al. in [4, 7].
In [18], Schneider deals with the problem of enforcing security properties in a sys-
tematic way. He discusses whether a given security property is enforceable and at what
cost. To study those issues, Schneider uses the class of enforcement mechanisms (EM)
that work by monitoring execution steps of a target system, herein and terminating its
execution if it is about to violate the security property being enforced.
A security automaton defined in [18] is a triple (Q, q0, δ) whereQ is a set of states,
q0 is the initial one and δ : Act × Q → Q, where Act is a set of security-relevant
actions, is the transition function. A security automata processes a sequence a1a2 . . .
of actions. At each step only one action is considered and for each action we calculate
the global state Q′ that is the set of the possible states for the current action, i.e. if the
automaton is checking the action ai then Q′ =
⋃
q∈Q′ δ(ai, q). If the automaton can
make a transition on a given action, i.e. Q′ is not empty, then the target is allowed to
perform that step. The state of the automaton changes according to the transition rules.
Otherwise the target execution is terminated. A security property that can be enforced
in this way corresponds to a safety property (according to [18], a property is a safety
∗Work partially supported by CNR project ”Trusted e-services for dynamic coalitions” and by EU-funded
project ”Software Engineering for Service-Oriented Overlay Computers”(SENSORIA) and by EU-funded
project ”Secure Software and Services for Mobile Systems ”(S3MS).
1
one, if whenever it does not hold in trace then it does not hold in any extension of this
trace).
Starting from the work of Schneider described above, Ligatti and al. in [4, 7] have
defined four different deterministic security automata which deal with finite sequences
of actions: the truncation automaton (similar to Schneider’s ones) which can recog-
nize bad sequences of actions and halts program execution before security property is
violated, but cannot otherwise modify program behavior. The behavior of these au-
tomata is similar to the behavior of security automata of Schneider’s because both of
them read one action at a time. The suppression automaton has the ability to suppress
individual program actions without terminating the program outright in addition to be-
ing able to halt program execution. The third automaton is the insertion automaton.
It is able to insert a sequence of actions into the program actions stream as well as
terminate the program. The last one is the edit automaton. It combines the power of
suppression and insertion automaton hence it is able to truncate actions sequences and
insert or suppress security-relevant actions at will.
These works have been extended by studying how truncation automata and edit
automata work on possible infinite sequence of actions (see [8]). In this way they
analyze how certain non-safety properties may be enforced. This work comes back to
the original Schneider’s idea to deal with also possibly infinite sequences of actions.
In this paper we introduce process algebra operators (see [15]) able to mimic the
behavior of the security automata briefly described above. The process algebra opera-
tors Y .KX (whereK is the name of the corresponding automata) act as programmable
controllers (Y ) of a target system (X).
We can then exploit a huge theory for security analysis based on process algebra
theory. In particular, depending on the kind of security automata one chooses, we
show how to automatically build programs that allow to enforce security properties
for whatever target system. Since many properties of systems are naturally specified
by means of fixed points, the µ-calculus is an expressive and important specification
language.
We automatically synthesize the appropriate controlling program Y for an operator
.K, given the security property φ expressed by a µ-calculus formula. The synthesis is
based on a satisfiability procedure for the µ-calculus that allows to obtain a model for
a logical formula (in our framework a suitable property), i.e., it is possible to decide if
there exists a model of a given logical formula. In particular, for truncation automata
we show a method to build the maximal model.
This work represents a significant contribution to the previous works (see [4, 7, 8, 18]),
where the synthesis problem for the security automata was not addressed. In fact, most
of the related works deal with the verification rather than with the synthesis problem.
Moreover, other approaches deal with the problem of monitoring the component X
to enjoy a given property, by treating it as the whole system of interest. However, often
not all the system needs to be checked (or it is simply not convenient to check it as a
whole). Some components could be trusted and one would like to have a method to
constrain only the un-trusted ones (e.g. downloaded applets). Similarly, it could not be
possible to build a reference monitor for a whole distributed architecture, while it could
be possible to have it for some of its components. Our approach is that it actually starts
from a property that the overall system must enjoy, say φ and, using the partial model
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checking technique, projects this property on another one that only the component X
must satisfy, say φ′. This allows one to monitor only the necessary/untrusted part of
the system. Thus we can now force X to enjoy φ′ by using an appropriate controller
Y ¤K X . (Note that as a special case we have the opportunity to treat X as a whole
system as in other approaches).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the necessary background on
process algebras and (Generalized) Structured Operational Semantics (SOS), logic and
security automata. Section 3 describes some process algebra operators (controllers)
corresponding to the security automata under investigation. Section 4 shows how to
automatically build controller programs that enforce desired security policies. Section
5 shows how to build the maximal model for truncation automata and Section 6 shows
a simple example.
2 Background
2.1 Operational semantics and process algebra
We recall a formal method for giving operational semantics to terms of a given lan-
guages. This approach is called Generalized Structured Operational Semantics (GSOS)
(see [5]). It permits to reason compositionally about the behavior of program terms.
2.1.1 GSOS format
Let V be a set of variables, ranged over by x, y, . . . and let Act be a finite set of actions,
ranged over by a, b, c . . . A signature Σ is a pair (F, ar) where:
• F is a set of function symbols, disjoints from V ,
• ar : F 7→ N is a rank function which gives the arity of a function symbol; if
f ∈ F and ar(f) = 0 then f is called a constant symbol.
Given a signature, let W ⊆ V be a set of variables. It is possible define the set of
Σ-terms over W as the least set s.t. every element in W is a term and if f ∈ F ,
ar(f) = n and t1, . . . , tn are terms then f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term. It is also possible
to define an assignment as a function γ from the set of variables to the set of terms
s.t. γ(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(γ(t1), . . . γ(tn)). Given a term t, let V ars(t) be the set of
variables in t. A term t is closed if V ars(t) = ∅.
Now we are able to describe the GSOS format. A GSOS rule r has the following
format:
{xi aij−→ yij}1≤i≤k1≤j≤mi {xi 6
bij−→}1≤i≤k1≤j≤ni
f(x1, . . . , xk)
c−→ g(~x, ~y) (1)
where all variables are distinct; ~x and ~y are the vectors of all xi and yij variables
respectively; mi, ni ≥ 0 and k is the arity of f . We say that f is the operator of the
rule (op(r) = f ) and c is the action. A GSOS system G is given by a signature and a
finite set of GSOS rules. Given a signature Σ = (F, ar), an assignment ζ is effective
for a term f(s1, . . . , sk) and a rule r if:
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1. ζ(xi) = si for 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
2. for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mi, it holds that ζ(xi) aij−→ ζ(yij);
3. for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, it holds that ζ(xi) 6 bij−→,
The transition relation among closed terms can be defined in the following way: we
have f(s1, . . . , sn)
c−→ s iff there exists an effective assignment ζ for a rule r with
operator f and action c s.t. s = ζ(g(~x, ~y)). There exists a unique transition relation
induced by a GSOS system (see [5]) and this transition relation is finitely branching.
2.1.2 An example: CCS process algebra
CCS of Milner (see [16]) is a language for describing concurrent systems. Here, we
present a formulation of Milner’s CCS, in the GSOS format.
The main operator is the parallel composition between processes, namely E‖F
because, as we explain better later, it permits to model the parallel composition of
processes. The notion of communication considered is a synchronous one, i.e. both
the processes must agree on performing the communication at the same time. It is
modeled by a simultaneous performing of complementary actions that is represented
by a synchronization action (or internal action) τ .
Let L be a finite set of actions, L¯ = {a¯ | a ∈ L} be the set of complementary
actions where¯is a bijection with a¯ = a, Act be L ∪ L¯ ∪ {τ}, where τ is a special
action that denotes an internal computation step (or communication) and Π be a set
of constant symbols that can be used to define processes with recursion. To give a
formulation of CCS dealing with GSOS, we define the signature ΣCCS = (FCCS , ar)
as follows.
FCCS = {0,+, ‖} ∪ {a.|a ∈ Act} ∪ {\L|L ⊆ L ∪ L¯} ∪ {[f ]|f : Act 7→ Act} ∪Π.
The function ar is defined as follows: ar(0) = 0 and for every pi ∈ Π we have
ar(pi) = 0, ‖ and + are binary operators and the other ones are unary operators.
The operational semantics of CCS closed terms is given by means of the GSOS
system in table 2. Informally, a (closed) term a.E represents a process that performs
an action a and then behaves as E. The term E + F represents the non-deterministic
choice between the processes E and F . Choosing the action of one of the two com-
ponents, the other is dropped. The term E‖F represents the parallel composition of
the two processes E and F . It can perform an action if one of the two processes can
perform an action, and this does not prevent the capabilities of the other process. The
third rule of parallel composition is characteristic of this calculus, it expresses that the
communication between processes happens whenever both can perform complemen-
tary actions. The resulting process is given by the parallel composition of the succes-
sors of each component, respectively. The process E\L behaves like E but the actions
in L ∪ L¯ are forbidden. To force a synchronization on an action between parallel pro-
cesses, we have to set restriction operator in conjunction with parallel one. The process
E[f ] behaves like the E but the actions are renamed viaf .
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2.2 Behavioral equivalence
It is often necessary to compare processes that are expressed using different terms but
have the same behavior.
2.2.1 Strong and weak bisimulations
We recall some useful relations between processes (see [16]). Now we give some
preliminary definition. In the following, we let τˆ = ² and for action a 6= τ aˆ = a.
Definition 1 Let (E , T ) be an LTS of concurrent processes, and let R be a binary re-
lation over E . ThenR is called strong simulation (denoted by≺) over (E , T ) iff, when-
ever (E,F ) ∈ R we have: if E a→ E′ then ∃F ′ ∈ E s. t. F a→ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R.
Moreover, a binary relationR over E is said a strong bisimulation (denoted by∼) over
the LTS of concurrent processes (E , T ) if both R and its converse are strong simula-
tion.
Referring to [5], let G be a GSOS system, the strong bisimulation is a congru-
ence w.r.t. the operations in G, i.e., the strong bisimulation is preserved by all GSOS
definable operators.
Another kind of equivalence is used when there is the necessity of understanding if
systems with different internal structure - and hence different internal behavior - have
the same external behavior and may thus be considered observationally equivalent.
First of all we present the notion of observational relation is the following: E τ⇒ E′
(or E ⇒ E′) if E τ→∗ E′ (where τ→∗ is the reflexive and transitive closure of the τ→
relation); E αˆ⇒ E′ if E τ⇒ αˆ→ τ⇒ E′.
LetDer(E) be the set of derivatives ofE, i.e., the set of process that can be reached
through the transition relations. Now we are able to give the following definition.
Definition 2 Let (E , T ) be an LTS of concurrent processes, and let R be a binary
relation over a set of process E . Then R is said to be a simulation (denoted by ¹)
if, whenever (E,F ) ∈ R, if E a→ E′ then ∃F ′ ∈ E s. t. F a⇒ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R.
Moreover, a binary relation R over E is said a weak bisimulation (denoted by ≈) over
the LTS of concurrent processes (E , T ) if bothR and its converse are weak simulation.
It is important to note that every strong simulation is also a weak one (see [16]).
2.3 Equational µ-calculus and partial model checking
Equational µ-calculus is a process logic well suited for specification and verification of
systems whose behavior is naturally described using state changes by means of actions.
It permits to express a lot of interesting properties like safety and liveness properties,
as well as allowing to express equivalence conditions over LTS. In order to define
recursively the properties of a given systems, this calculus uses fixpoint equations. Let
a be in Act and X be a variable ranging over a finite set of variables V . Given the
grammar:
A ::= X | T | F | A1 ∧A2 | A1 ∨A2 | 〈a〉A | [a]A
D ::= X =ν AD | X =µ AD | ²
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where the symbolTmeans true andFmeans false; ∧ is the symbol for the conjunction
of formulae, i.e. the conjunctionA1∧A2 holds iff both of the formulaeA1 andA2 hold,
and ∨ is the disjunction of formulae and A1∨A2 holds when at least one of A1 and A2
holds. Moreover the meaning of 〈a〉A (possibility operator) is ”it is possible to do an
a-action to a state where A holds” and the meaning of [a]A (necessity operator) is ”for
all a-actions performed A holds”. X =µ A is a minimal fixpoint equation, where A is
an assertion (i.e. a simple modal formula without recursion operator), and X =ν A is a
maximal fixpoint equation. Roughly, the semantic JDK of the list of equations D is the
solution of the system of equations corresponding to D . According to this notation,JDK(X) is the set of values of the variable X , and E |= D ↓ X can be used as a short
notation for E ∈ JDK(X). The formal semantic is in Table 3 in appendix.
The following standard result of µ-calculus will be useful in the reminder of the
paper.
Theorem 1 ([20]) Given a formula φ it is possible to decide in exponential time in the
length of φ if there exists a model of φ and it is also possible to give an example of such
model.
Partial model checking (pmc) is a technique that was originally developed for compo-
sitional analysis of concurrent systems (processes) (see [2]). The intuitive idea under-
lying the pmc is the following: proving that E‖F satisfies a formula φ (E‖F |= φ) is
equivalent to proving that F satisfies a modified specification φ//E (F |= φ//E), where
//E is the partial evaluation function for the parallel composition operator. The for-
mula φ is specified by use the equational µ-calculus. A useful result of partial model
checking is the following.
Lemma 1 ([2]) Given a process E‖F and a formula φ we have: E‖F |= φ iff F |=
φ//E .
The reduced formula φ//E depends only on the formula φ and on process E. No
information is required on the process F which can represent a possible enemy. Thus,
given a certain system E, it is possible to find the property that the enemy must satisfy
to make a successful attack on the system. It is worth noticing that partial model
checking function may be automatically derived from the semantics rules used to define
a language semantics. Thus, the proposed technique is very flexible.
A lemma similar to Lemma 1 holds for every process algebra operators (see [2]).
The partial model checking functions for parallel operator, relabeling and restriction
are given in Table 4 and Table 5 in appendix.
2.4 Characteristic formulae
A characteristic formula is a formula in equational µ-calculus that completely charac-
terizes the behavior of a (state in a) LTS modulo a chosen notion of behavioral relation.
It is possible to define the notion of characteristic formula for a given finite state process
E w.r.t. weak bisimulation as follows (see [17]).
Definition 3 Given a finite state process E, its characteristic formula (w.r.t. weak
bisimulation) DE ↓ XE is defined by the following equations for every E′ ∈ Der(E),
XE′ =ν (
∧
a;E′′:E′ a→E′′〈〈aˆ〉〉XE′′) ∧ (
∧
a∈Act([a](
∨
E′′:E′ aˆ⇒E′′ XE′′)))
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where 〈〈aˆ〉〉 is the equivalent of the modality operator 〈aˆ〉 w.r.t. weak bisimulation,
which can be introduce as abbreviation (see [17]):
〈〈²〉〉φ def= µX.φ ∨ 〈τ〉X 〈〈a〉〉φ def= 〈〈²〉〉〈a〉〈〈²〉〉φ
The following lemma characterizes the power of these formulae.
Lemma 2 ([17]) Let E1 and E2 be two finite-state processes. If φE2 is characteristic
for E2 then:
1. If E1 ≈ E2 then E1 |= φE2
2. If E1 |= φE2 and E1 is finite-state then E1 ≈ E2.
It is possible to define the notion of characteristic formula for a finite state process E
w.r.t. weak simulation as follows.
Definition 4 Given a finite state process, its characteristic formula (w.r.t. weak sim-
ulation) DE ↓ XE is defined by the following equations for every E′ ∈ Der(E),
XE′ =ν
∧
a∈Act([a](
∨
E′′:E′ aˆ⇒E′′ XE′′))
Following the reasoning used in [17] for the definition of characteristic formula w.r.t
strong bisimulation. The following proposition holds.
Lemma 3 Let E be a finite-state process and let φE,¹ be its characteristic formula
w.r.t. weak simulation, F ¹ E ⇔ F |= φE,¹
2.5 Enforcement mechanisms and Security automata
In this paper we chose to follow the semantic approach given by Ligatti and al. in [4]
to describe the behavior of four different kind of security automata.
A security automaton at least consist of a (countable) set of states, Q, a set of
actions Act and a transition (partial) function δ : Act × Q → Q. We use also σ to
denote a sequences of actions, · for the empty sequence and τ 1 to represent an internal
action.
The execution of each different kind of security automata is specified by a labeled
operational semantics. The basic single-step judgment has the form (σ, q) a−→ (σ′, q′)
where σ′ and q′ denote the action sequence and state after the automaton takes a single
step, and a denotes the sequence of actions produced by the automaton. The single-step
judgment can be generalized to a multi-step judgment ((σ, q) γ=⇒2 (σ′, q′)), where γ
is a sequences of actions, as follows.
(σ, q) .=⇒ (σ, q) (Reflex)
(σ, q) a−→ (σ′′, q′′) (σ′′, q′′) γ=⇒ (σ′, q′)
(σ, q)
a;γ
=⇒ (σ′, q′)
(Trans)
The operational semantics for each security automaton is the following.
1In [4] internal actions are denoted by ·. We use τ because we use process algebras where internal actions
are commonly denoted by τ .
2Consider a finite sequence of visible actions γ = a1, . . . , an. Here we use ⇒ to denote automata
computation. Before we use the same notation for process algebra computation. The meaning of the symbol
will be clear from the context.
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Truncation automaton. The operational semantic of truncation automata is:
(σ, q) a−→T (σ′, q′) (T-Step)
if σ = a;σ′
and δ(a, q) = q′
(σ, q) τ−→T (·, q) (T-Stop)
otherwise.
Suppression automaton. It is define as (Q, q0, δ, ω)where ω : Act×Q → {−,+} in-
dicates whether or not the action in question should be suppressed (-) or emitted
(+).
(σ, q) a−→S (σ′, q′) (S-StepA)
if σ = a;σ′
and δ(a, q) = q′
and ω(a, q) = +
(σ, q) τ−→S (σ′, q′) (S-StepS)
if σ = a;σ′
and δ(a, q) = q′
and ω(a, q) = −
(σ, q) τ−→S (·, q) (S-Stop)
otherwise.
Insertion automaton. It is define as (Q, q0, δ, γ) where γ : Act×Q → Act×Q that
specifies the insertion of an action into the sequence of actions of the program. It
is necessary to note that in [4, 7] the automaton inserts a finite sequence of actions
instead of only one action, i.e., it controls if a wrong action is performed by
function γ. If it holds, the automaton inserts a finite sequence of actions, hence
there exists a finite number of intermediate states. Without loss of generality,
we consider that it performs only one action. In this way we openly consider all
intermediate state. Note that the domain of γ is disjoint from the domain of δ in
order to have a deterministic automata;
(σ, q) a−→I (σ′, q′) (I-Step)
if σ = a;σ′
and δ(a, q) = q′
(σ, q) b−→I (σ, q′) (I-Ins)
if σ = a;σ′
and γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
(σ, q) τ−→I (·, q) (I-Stop)
otherwise.
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Edit automaton. It is defined as (Q, q0, δ, γ, ω) where γ : Act×Q → Act×Q that
specifies the insertion of a finite sequence of actions into the program’s action
sequence and ω : Act × Q → {−,+} indicates whether or not the action in
question should be suppressed (-) or emitted (+). Also here the domain of γ is
disjoint from the domain of δ in order to have a deterministic automata.
(σ, q) a−→E (σ′, q′) (E-StepA)
if σ = a;σ′
and δ(a, q) = q′
and ω(a, q) = +
(σ, q) τ−→E (σ′, q′) (E-StepS)
if σ = a;σ′
and δ(a, q) = q′
and ω(a, q) = −
(σ, q) b−→E (σ, q′) (E-Ins)
if σ = a;σ′
and γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
(σ, q) τ−→E (·, q) (E-Stop)
otherwise.
3 Modeling security automata with process algebra
In this Section we give the semantics of some process algebra operators that act as
controller operators, denoted by Y .K X where K ∈ {T, S, I, E}3. These can permit
to control the behavior of the (possibly untrusted) component X , given the behavior of
the control program Y .
3.1 Our controller operators in process algebra
To compare security automata with our controllers, it is crucial to have a rigorous defi-
nition of the semantic rules that describe the behavior of each operator. We denote with
E the program controller and with F the target. We work, without loss of generality,
under the additional assumption that E and F never perform the internal action τ .
3.1.1 Truncation automata: .T
E
a→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .T F
a→ E′ .T F ′
This operator models the truncation automaton that is similar to Schneider’s automaton
(when considering only deterministic automata, e.g., see [4, 7]). Its semantic rule states
that if F performs the action a and the same action is performed by E (so it is allowed
in the current state of the automaton), then E .T F performs the action a, otherwise it
halts. The following proposition holds.
3We choose these symbols to denote four operators that have the same behavior of truncation, suppres-
sion, insertion and edit automata, respectively.
9
Proposition 1 Each sequences of actions that is an output of a truncation automata
(Q, q0, δ) is also derivable from .T and vice-versa.
3.1.2 Suppression automata: .S
E
a→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .S F
a→ E′ .S F ′
E
−a−→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .S F
τ→ E′ .S F ′
where −a is a control action not in Act (so it does not admit a complementary action).
As for the truncation automaton, if F performs the same action performed by E also
E.S F performs it. On the contrary, if F performs an action a that E does not perform
and E can perform the control action −a then E .S F performs the action τ that sup-
presses the action a, i.e., a becomes not visible from external observation. Otherwise,
E .S F halts. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 Each sequences of actions that is an output of a suppression automata
(Q, q0, δ, ω) is also derivable from .S and vice-versa.
3.1.3 Insertion automata: .I
E
a→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .I F
a→ E′ .I F ′
E 6 a→ E′ E +a.b−→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .I F
b→ E′ .I F
4
where +a is an action not in Act. If F performs an action a that also E can perform,
the whole system makes this action. If F performs an action a that E does not perform
and E detects it by performing a control action +a, then the whole system perform the
an action b. It is possible to note that in the description of insertion automata in [4]
the domains of γ and δ are disjoint. In our case, this is guarantee by the premise of
the second rule in which we have that E 6 a−→ E′, E +a.b−→ E′. In fact for the insertion
automata, if a pair (a, q) is not in the domain of δ and it is in the domain of γ it means
that the action a and the state q are not compatible so in order to change state an action
different from a must be performed. It is important to note that it is able to insert
new actions but it is not able to suppress any action performed by F . The following
proposition holds.
Proposition 3 Each sequences of actions that is an output of a insertion automata
(Q, q0, δ, γ) is also derivable from .I and vice-versa.
3.1.4 Edit automata: .E
In order to do insertion and suppression together we define the following controller
operator. Its rule is the union of the rules of the .S and .I .
E
a→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .E F
a→ E′ .E F ′
E
−a−→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .E F
τ→ E′ .E F ′
E 6 a→ E′ E +a.b→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .E F
b→ E′ .E F
4This means E +a−→ Ea b−→ E′. However we consider +a.b as a single action, i.e. the state Ea is hide
and we do not consider it in Der(E).
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This operator combines the power of the previous two ones. The following proposition
holds.
Proposition 4 Each sequences of actions that is an output of an edit automata
(Q, q0, δ, γ, ω) is also derivable from .E and vice-versa.
It is important to note that we introduced the control action −a in the semantic of .S
and+a in the semantic of .I in order to find operators that were as similar as possible to
suppression and insertion automata, respectively. Other definitions could be possible,
although some attempts we made failed on defining and tractable semantics.
4 Synthesis of controller programs
Exploiting our framework we can build a program controller Y which allows to enforce
a desired security property for any target system X . We present an extension of [12].
Here we have four different operators and in particular we have to deal with control
actions.
Let S be a system, and let X be one component that may be dynamically changed
(e.g., a downloaded mobile agent) that we consider an unknown agent, i.e. we do not
know what is the behavior of X . At the beginning we have the system S‖X , and
we want that it enjoys a security property expressed by a logical formula φ, i.e., ∀X
(S‖X)\L |= φ. In order to protect the system we may simply check the correctness of
each process X before it is executed or, if it is not possible (or not desirable), we may
define a controller that, in any case, forces each process to behave correctly.
We study here how to build a program controller in order to force the intruder to
behave correctly, i.e. as prescribed by the formula φ. Thus, we want to find a control
program Y such that:
∀X (S‖Y .K X)\L |= φ (2)
By using the partial model checking approach proposed in [11], we can focus on
the properties of Y .K X , i.e.:
∃Y ∀X (Y .K X) |= φ′ (3)
where φ′ = φ//S,\L. In order to manage the universal quantification in (3), we prove
the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For every K ∈ {T, S, I, E} Y .K X ¹ Y [fK] holds, where fK is a
relabeling function depending on K. In particular, fT is the identity function on Act5
and
fS(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Act
τ if a = −a fI(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Act
τ if a = +a fE(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Act
τ if a ∈ {+a,−a}
Now we restrict ourselves to a subclass of equational µ-calculus formulae that is de-
noted by Frµ. This class consists in equational µ-calculus formulae without 〈 〉. It is
easy to prove that this set of formulae is close for partial model checking function. The
following result holds.
5Here the set Act must be consider enriched by control actions
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Proposition 6 Let E and F be two finite state processes and φ ∈ Frµ. If F ¹ E then
E |= φ⇒ F |= φ.
At this point in order to check the equation (3) it is sufficient to check:
∃Y Y [fK] |= φ′
To further reduce the previous equation, we can use the partial model checking function
for relabeling operator. Hence, for everyK ∈ {T, S, I, E} we calculate φ′′K = φ′//[fK] .
Thus we obtain:
∃Y Y |= φ′′K (4)
In this way we reduce ourselves to a satisfiability problem in µ-calculus that can be
solved by Theorem 1.
5 Automated synthesis of Schneider’s controller opera-
tor
In this section we synthesize a maximal program controller Y for the operator Y .T X
by exploiting the theory developed by Walukiewicz in [13, 21].
We define the notion of maximal model w.r.t. the relation of simulation as follows:
a process E is a maximal model for a given formula φ iff E |= φ and ∀E′ s.t. E′ |=
φ, E′ ¹ E.
Informally, the maximal program controller Y is the process that restricts as less as
possible the activity of the target X .
Usually the discovered model is a non-deterministic process. In order to find a
deterministic model we consider a subset of formulae of Frµ without ∨. This set of
formulae is called the universal conjunctive µ-calculus formulae, ∀∧µC (see [6]).
Definition 5 The set ∀∧µC of universal conjunctive µ-calculus formulae is the largest
subset of equational µ-calculus formulae that can be written without either the ∨ op-
erator and the 〈 〉 modality.
Proposition 7 Given a formula φ ∈ ∀∧µC, a maximal deterministic model E of this
formula exists.
Due to the fact that Schneider in his article [18] is interested in trace of executions6, we
assume that the process with a good behavior is deterministic, i.e., we are interested in
properties of the form (E‖X)\L ¹ E\L where E\L a deterministic process. Hence
the characteristic formula of E, XE′ =ν
∧
a∈Act([a](
∨
E′′:E′ aˆ⇒E′′ XE′′))), becomes
simpler because
∨
E′′:E′ aˆ⇒E′′ XE′′ is reduced either to XE′′ or to false. So it is in∀∧µC.
In order to apply our logical approach based on partial model checking we also
need to ensure that after the partial model checking phase for the characteristic formula
6For any E ∈ E the set Tr(E) of traces associated with E is Tr(E) = {γ ∈ (Act\{τ})∗|∃E′ :
E
γ
=⇒ E′}.
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we still get a formula in ∀∧µC whose satisfiability procedure returns a deterministic
process. This actually holds.
Proposition 8 ([6]) ∀∧µC is closed under the partial model checking function.
Thus, by using the result in proposition 7, it is possible to find a maximal deterministic
model that synthesizes a controller operator to force a security policy, i.e. the synthesis
of a truncation automaton for a component that will allow the whole system to enjoy
the desired security property.
6 A simple example
Consider the process S = a.b.0 and consider the following equational definition Z =ν
[τ ]Z ∧ [a][[c]]7F. It asserts that after every action a cannot be perform an action c.
Let Act = {a, b, c, τ, a¯, b¯, c¯} be the set of actions. Applying the partial evaluation
for the parallel operator we obtain, after some simplifications, the following system of
equation, that we denoted with D:
Z//S =ν [τ ]Z//S ∧ [a¯]Z//S′ ∧ [a]W//S ∧W//S′
W//S′ =ν [τ ]W//S′ ∧ [b¯]W//0 ∧ [c]F
Z//S′ =ν [τ ]Z//S′ ∧ [b¯]Z//0 ∧ [a]W//S′
W//S =ν [τ ]W//S ∧ [a¯]W//S′ ∧ [c]F
Z//0 = T
W//0 = T
where S a−→ S′ so S′ is b.0.
The information obtained through partial model checking can be used to enforce a
security policy. In particular, choosing one of the four operators and using its definition
we simply need to find a process Y [fK], whereK depend on the chosen controller, that
is a model for the previous formula. In this simple example we choose the controller
operator .S . Hence we apply the partial model checking for relabeling function fS
to the previous formula, that we have simplified replacing W//0 and Z//0 by T. We
obtain that D//fS is:
Z//S =ν [−c]Z//S ∧ [a¯]Z//S′ ∧ [a]W//S ∧W//S′
W//S′ =ν [−c]W//S′ ∧ [b¯]T ∧ [c]F
Z//S′ =ν [−c]Z//S′ ∧ [b¯]T ∧ [a]W//S′
W//S =ν [−c]W//S ∧ [a¯]W//S′ ∧ [c]F
We can note note the process Y = a. − c.0 is a model of D//fS . Then, for any
component X , we have S‖(Y .S X) satisfies D. For instance, consider X = a.c.0.
Looking at the first rule of .S , we have:
(S‖(Y .S X)) = (a.b.0‖(a.− c.0 .S a.c.0)) a−→ (a.b.0‖(−c.0 .S c.0))
Using the second rule we eventually get:
(a.b.0‖(−c.0 .S c.0)) τ−→ (a.b.0‖0 .S 0)
7We define [[c]]φ as ¬〈〈c〉〉¬φ where 〈〈c〉〉 is defined as follows: 〈〈²〉〉φ def= µX.φ∨〈τ〉X , 〈〈c〉〉φ def=
〈〈²〉〉〈c〉〈〈²〉〉φ. (see [17]).
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and so the system still preserve its security since the actions performed by the compo-
nent X have been prevented from being visible outside.
7 Discussion on enforcing techniques
7.1 Security automata
As we have already said, one way to enforce security properties is with a monitor that
runs in parallel with the target program (see [18]). A program monitor can be for-
mally modeled by a security automaton. A security automaton defined in [18] is a
triple (Q, q0, δ) where Q is a set of states, q0 is the initial one and δ : Act ×Q → Q,
where Act is a set of security-relevant actions, is the transition function. A security
automata processes a sequence a1a2 . . . of actions. At each step only one action is
considered and for each action we calculate the global state Q′ that is the set of the
possible states for the current action, i.e. if the automaton is checking the action ai
then Q′ =
⋃
q∈Q′ δ(ai, q). If the automaton can make a transition on a given action,
i.e. Q′ is not empty, then the target is allowed to perform that step. The state of the
automaton changes according to the transition rules. Otherwise the target execution is
terminated. Thus, at every step, it verifies if the action is in the set of the possible ac-
tions or not. As we have already shown, in [7] four different kind of security automata
are defined. To study the cost in term of time of these security automata, we must
consider how much transition function costs. Since the security automata we consider
are deterministic (thus Q′ would be either a singleton or empty), by using the standard
graphical representation through matrix, it is easy to understand that the cost in time
is O(1). Thus, given a sequence of n actions, we need O(n) to check whether this
sequence is acceptable or not.
7.1.1 Enforceable properties with Security automata
Referring to [18], the truncation automata is able to enforce security property that cor-
responds to a safety property (according to [18], a property is a safety one, if whenever
it does not hold in trace then it does not hold in any extension of this trace).
Refer to [7] we consider the effectively enforcement. This definition of enforce-
ment uses a system-specific equivalence relation (∼=) on executions that is reflexive,
symmetric and transitive. Moreover, any property that we might consider should not
distinguish equivalent sequences:
σ ∼= σ′ ⇒ P (σ)⇔ P (σ′)
where P is the property that we want enforce.
Definition 6 A automaton A with starting state q0 effectively enforces a property P
on the system with action set Act iff ∀σ ∈ −→Act8 ∃q′ ∃σ′ ∈ −→Act:
1. (σ, q0)
σ′=⇒A (·, q′)
8−→Act is the set of sequences of actions
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truncating props
insertion props suppression props
editing properties
Figure 1: A taxonomy of effectively enforceable security properties
2. P (σ′), and
3. P (σ)⇒ σ ∼= σ′.
The power of the four different kinds of security automata is different as we show in
Figure 1.
7.2 Model checking a path
A technique that is used in run-time verification is the model checking a path, i.e.,
solve the model checking problem on a single path instead on the whole model. It was
introduced by Markey and Schnoebelen in [9].
In particular, this technique is developed for model checking of linear time logic.
We recall some definitions, even if, we will not recall the syntax and semantics ofLTL.
Definition 7 A path is a finite sequence of states pi = s0, s1, . . . where a state is a
valuation s ∈ 2AP of the atomic proposition (namely AP ). |pi| ∈ N ∪ {ω} denotes the
length of pi.
Let L a linear logic.
Path Model Checking for L (PMC(L)):
Input: given a path u and a temporal formula φ of L.
Output: yes iff u |= φ, no otherwise.
Using standard dynamic programming methods a path can obviously be checked
in bilinear time, O(|path| × |formula|). In particular, we recall here some important
results on linear temporal logic.
Theorem 2 ([9]) PMC(LTL) can be solved in time O(|u| × |φ|) where φ is an LTL
formula.
Theorem 3 ([9]) PMC(LTL + Past) can be solved in time O(|u| × |φ|) where φ is
an LTL+ Past formula.
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Logic: Relabeling:
FOMLO PSPACE − complete
LTL PTIME − easy
LTL+ Past PTIME − easy
LTL+ Past+Now PTIME − complete
LTL+ Chop PTIME − complete
Table 1: Checking richly expressing logics on paths
In [9] article, authors study the complexity of the model checking a path on linear
temporal logic and prove that for the first-order monadic logic of order the algorithm
is PSPACE-complete. In [10], they prove that model checking a path of modal µ-
calculus formulae has the complexity of O(|u| × |φ|ad) where ad is the alternation
depth (when dealing with safety properties it is 1).
We show in Table 19 all the complexity results.
7.2.1 Enforceable properties with model checking (paths)
We can use this approach in order to enforce security properties. This technique permit
us to control if a target execution is correct or not. As we have already said, this
techniques was developed in order to deal with run-time verification.
The algorithm: The behavior of the target is not known a priori. To every target
action is associated a new target state. Thus every time an action is performed a new
state is add to the path that have to be checked. Hence for every action we apply PMC
on the new path. For example, let pit the sequence of states at time t. We can apply
path model checking on pit. If the output is ”yes” we allow that the target performs the
next action a, otherwise we stop it. After an action a the target goes in a new state st+1
and the sequences of state becomes pit+1 and we repeat the same algorithm. Using
standard dynamic programming, that works by memorizing outputs that are obtained
at the previous step of the algorithm, the cost of this method is O(|path| × |φ|) where
φ is a LTL formula.
We can note that this technique is developed o LTL formulae and, in [9], the au-
thors give the cost of the algorithm for LTL formulae and for LTL+ Past formulae.
These two logics are suitable for express safety properties.
7.3 Comparison
It is easy to note that using this technique it is easy to implement a controller with the
same behavior of truncation automata. In fact, this technique permits to recognize a
bad action but it does not give any advantage to repair it. Security automata instead
allow us to modify the behavior of a target system to make it compliant with the policy.
9Take from [9]
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This is a main difference from a declarative policy language as logic instead of an
operational one as security automata.
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A Tables
In this section there are all the table whose references are in the paper. The first table
shows the operational semantics of CCS; the second one the equational µ-calculus.
The last two tables show how partial evaluation function works w.r.t. parallel, restric-
tion and relabeling operators respectively.
B Technical proofs
Lemma 3 Let E be a finite-state process and let φE,¹ be its characteristic formula
w.r.t. weak simulation then F ¹ E ⇔ F |= φE,¹.
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Prefixing:
a.x
a−→ x
Choice: x
a−→ x′
x+ y a−→ x′
y
a−→ y′
x+ y a−→ y′
Parallel: x
a−→ x′
x‖y a−→ x′‖y
y
a−→ y′
x‖y a−→ x‖y′
x
l−→ x y l¯−→ y′
x‖y τ−→ x′‖y′
Restriction: x
a−→ x′
x\L a−→ x′\L
Relabeling: x
a−→ x′
x[f ] a
′
−→ x′[f ]
Table 2: GSOS system for CCS.
JTK′ρ = S JFK′ρ = ∅ JXK′ρ = ρ(X) JA1 ∧A2K′ρ = JA1K′ρ ∩ JA2K′ρJA1 ∨A2K′ρ = JA1K′ρ ∪ JA2K′ρ J〈a〉AK′ρ = {s | ∃s′ : s a→ s′ and s′ ∈ JAK′ρ}J[a]AK′ρ = {s | ∀s′ : s a→ s′ implies s′ ∈ JAK′ρ}
We use unionsq to represent union of disjoint environments. Let ρ be the environment ( a
function from variables to values) and σ be in {µ, ν}, then σU.f(U) represents the σ
fixpoint of the function f in one variable U .J²Kρ = [] JX =σ AD′Kρ = JD′K(ρunionsq[U ′/X]) unionsq [U ′/X]
where U ′ = σU.JAK′(ρunionsq[U/X]unionsqρ′(U)) and ρ′(U) = JD′K(ρunionsq[U/X]).
It informally says that the solution to (X =σ A)D is the σ fixpoint solution U ′ of JAK
where the solution to the rest of the lists of equations D is used as environment.
Table 3: Equational µ-calculus
Proof: In order to prove the following proposition we give the following chain:
F ¹ E ⇔ ∀a F a→ F ′ ∃E′ E a⇒ E′ ∧ F ′ ¹ E′ ⇔
∀a F a→ F ′ F ′ |= ∨XE′ ⇔ ∀a F |= [a](∨XE′)⇔
F |= ∧([a](∨XE′))
2
Before starting to prove proposition 1, 2, 3, 4, we note that in our controller operator
the halt condition is not roundly given because this occurs when there are not rule that
could be applied, i.e., when premises of all rules are not verify. As we have already
note, also in security automata described in section 2.5, the action τ in stop rule of each
automata is an internal action that is not really performed. So in our proofs, without
loss of validity, we can omit the stop case because the stop rule of each automata is
equivalent to the halt condition of respectively operator.
Proposition 1 Each sequence of actions that is an output of a truncation automata
(Q, q0, δ) is also derivable from .T and vice-versa.
Proof: To simplify the notation, (σ, q) denotes a generic state of automata and
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(D↓ X)//t = (D//t)↓ Xt ²//t = ²
(X =σ AD)//t = ((Xs =σ A//s)s∈Der(E))(D)//t X//t = Xt
[a]A//s = [a](A//s) ∧∧
s
a−→s′ A//s
′, if a 6= τ A1 ∧A2//s = (A1//s) ∧ (A2//s)
〈a〉A//s = 〈a〉(A//s) ∨∨
s
a−→s′ A//s
′, if a 6= τ A1 ∨A2//s = (A1//s) ∨ (A2//s)
[τ ]A//s = [τ ](A//s) ∧∧
s
τ−→s′ A//s
′ ∧∧
s
a−→s′ [a](A //s′)〈τ〉A//s = 〈τ〉(A//s) ∨∨
s
τ−→s′ A//s
′ T//s = T F//s = F
Table 4: Partial evaluation function for parallel operator E‖ .
Restriction: Relabeling:
X//\L = X X//[f ] = X
〈a〉A//\L =
{ 〈a〉(A//\L) if a 6∈ L ∪ L¯
F if a ∈ L 〈a〉A//[f ] =
∨
b:f(a)=b〈b〉(A//[f ])
[a]A//\L =
{
[a](A//\L) if a 6∈ L ∪ L¯
T if a ∈ L [a]A//[f ] =
∧
b:f(a)=b〈b〉(A//[f ])
A1 ∧A2//\L = (A1//\L) ∧ (A2//\L) A1 ∧A2//[f ] = (A1//[f ]) ∧ (A2//[f ])
A1 ∨A2//\L = (A1//\L) ∨ (A2//\L) A1 ∨A2//[f ] = (A1//[f ]) ∨ (A2//[f ])
T//\L = T T//[f ] = T
F//\L = F F//[f ] = F
Table 5: Partial evaluation function for restriction and relabeling operator.
E.T F a generic state of the process. In order to define a relation of strong bisimulation
RT , we underline that every couple (σ, q) of the suppression automata depend on δ.
As the process E is a constant, also it can depend on this function. So we denote E
with Eq. This process has the following definition:
Eq = a.Eq
′
iff δ(a, q) = q′
Now we can define RT in the following way:
RT = {((σ, q), Eq .T F ) : (σ, q) ∈ −→Act×Q, F σ7→}
Assume that (σ, q) a−→T (σ′, q′). For the semantic rule of .T , if Eq a−→ Eq′ and
F
a−→ F ′ perform the action a also Eq .T F a−→ Eq′ .T F ′ and F ′ σ
′
7→.
Now assume that Eq .T F
a−→ Eq′ .T F ′ and F ′ σ
′
7→. This means that δ(a, q) = q′
and σ = a;σ′. We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) a−→T (σ, q)′ and
(Eq
′
.T F
′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RT . For the rule T-Step, (σ, q) a−→T (σ′, q′). So the couple that
we are looking for is (σ′, q′). 2
Proposition 2 Each sequence of actions that is an output of a suppression automata
(Q, q0, δ, ω) is also derivable from .S and vice-versa.
Proof: The scheme of the proof and the notation are the same of the previous one.
Every couple (σ, q) of the suppression automata depend on δ and ω hence we denote
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E with Eq,ω and define it as follows
Eq,ω = a.Eq
′,ω iff ω(a, q) = + and δ(a, q) = q′
= −a.Eq′,ω iff ω(a, q) = − and δ(a, q) = q′
Now we can define RS in the following way:
RS = {((σ, q), Eq,ω .S F ) : (σ, q) ∈ −→Act×Q, F σ7→}
We have two cases: the first one is similar of proposition 1 in fact, let ((σ, q), Eq,ω.SF )
be in RS and (σ, q) a−→S (σ′, q′). We should prove that exists a (Eq,ω .S F )′ s.t.
Eq,ω .S F
a−→ (Eq,ω .S F )′ and ((σ′, q′), (Eq,ω .S F )′) ∈ RS . By the first rule
of .S and by definition of Eq,ω , using a similar reason of the proof of proposition 1,
we trivially have the thesis. On the other hand, let (Eq,ω .S F, (σ, q)) be in RS and
Eq,ω.SF
a−→ Eq′,ω.SF ′. We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) a−→S (σ, q)′
and (Eq′,ω .S F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RS . For the rule S-StepA we have that (σ′, q′) is the
solution we are looking for. The reasoning is similar to the previous one.
Now, let ((σ, q), Eq,ω .S F ) be in RS and (σ, q) τ−→S (σ′, q′). We should prove
that exists a (Eq,ω .S F )′ s.t. Eq,ω .S F
τ−→ (Eq,ω .S F )′ and ((σ′, q′), (Eq,ω .S
F )′) ∈ RS . We have, by the second rule of .S and by the definition of Eq,ω , that
if Eq,ω −a−→ Eq′,ω and F a−→ F ′ then Eq,ω .S F τ−→ Eq′,ω .S F ′. We have also
F ′ σ7→′.So ((σ′, q′), Eq′,ω .S F ′) ∈ RS trivially.
Now assume that (Eq,ω .S F, (σ, q)) be in RS and Eq,ω .S F τ−→ Eq′,ω .S F ′.
Remembering that neither E nor F can perform the action τ , this transection means
that δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = −. We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) τ−→S
(σ, q)′ and (Eq′,ω .S F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RS . For the rule S-StepS we have that (σ′, q′) is
the solution we are looking for. The reasoning is similar to the previous one. 2
Proposition 3 Each sequence of actions that is an output of a insertion automata
(Q, q0, δ, γ) is also derivable from .I and vice-versa.
Proof: The scheme of the proof and the notation are the same of the previous one.
Every couple (σ, q) of the suppression automata depend on δ and γ hence we denote
E with Eq,γ and define it as follows.
Eq,γ = a.Eq
′,γ iff δ(a, q) = q′
= +a.b.Eq
′,γ iff γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
Now we can define RI in the following way:
RI = {((σ, q), Eq,γ .I F ) : (σ, q) ∈ −→Act×Q, F σ7→}
We have two cases: the first one is similar of proposition 1 in fact, let ((σ, q), Eq,γ.I
F ) be in RI and (σ, q) a−→I (σ′, q′). We should prove that exists a (Eq,γ .I F )′ s.t.
Eq,γ .I F
a−→ (Eq,γ .I F )′ and ((σ′, q′), (Eq,γ .I F )′) ∈ RI . By the first rule of
.I and by definition of Eq,γ ,using a similar reasoning of the proof of proposition 1,
we trivially have the thesis. On the other hand, let (Eq,γ .I F, (σ, q)) be in RI and
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Eq,γ .I F
a−→ Eq′,γ .I F ′. We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) a−→I (σ, q)′
and (Eq′,γ .I F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RI . For the rule I-Step we have that (σ′, q′) is the solution
we are looking for. The reasoning is similar to the previous one.
Now let ((σ, q), Eq,γ .I F ) be in RI and (σ, q) b−→I (σ, q′). We should prove that
exists a (Eq,γ .I F )′ s.t. Eq,γ .I F
b−→ (Eq,γ .I F )′ and ((σ, q′), (Eq,γ .I F )′) ∈ RI .
We have, by second rule of .I and by to the definition of Eq,γ , that if Eq,γ 6 a−→ Eq′,γ ,
Eq,γ
+a.b−→ Eq′,γ and F a−→ F ′ then Eq,γ .I F b−→ Eq′,γ .I F . So (Eq,γ .I F )′ is
Eq
′,γ .I F and ((σ, q′), Eq
′,γ .I F ) ∈ RI trivially.
Now, let (Eq,γ .I F, (σ, q)) be inRI and Eq,γ .I F b−→ Eq′,γ .I F . this means that
σ = a;σ′ and γ(a, q) = (b, q′). We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) b−→
(σ, q)′ and (Eq′,γ .I F, (σ, q)′) ∈ RI . For the rule I-Ins we have that (σ, q′) is the
solution we are looking for. The reasoning is similar to the previous one. 2
Proposition 4 Each sequence of actions that is an output of an edit automata
(Q, q0, δ, γ, ω) is also derivable from .E and vice-versa.
Proof: In order to prove this lemma, we give the relation of bisimulationRE which
exists between edit automata and the controller operator .E .
Eq,γ,ω = a.Eq
′,γ,ω iff δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = +
= −a.Eq′,γ,ω iff δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = −
= +a.b.Eq
′,γ,ω iff γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
We define RE in the following way:
RE = {((σ, q), Eq,γ,ω .E F ) : (σ, q) ∈ −→Act×Q, Eq,γ,ω .E F ∈ P, F σ7→}
We have three cases ad their proof following the reasoning made in the proof of lemma
2 and lemma 3. In fact:
• – Let ((σ, q), Eq,γ,ω .E F ) be in RE and (σ, q) a−→E (σ′, q′). We should
prove that exists a (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ s.t. Eq,γ,ω .E F
a−→E (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′
and ((σ′, q′), (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′) ∈ RE . We have, by the first rule of .E
and by definition of Eq,γ,ω , that if Eq,γ,ω a−→E Eq′,γ,ω and F a−→ F ′
then Eq,γ,ω .E F
a−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′. Now F ′ σ7→
′
. So (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ is
Eq
′,γ,ω .E F
′ and ((σ′, q′), Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′) ∈ RE trivially.
– Let (Eq,γ,ω .E F, (σ, q)) be in RE and Eq,γ,ω .E F a−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′.
We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) a−→ (σ, q)′ and (Eq′,γ,ω .E
F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RE . For the rule E-StepA we have that (σ′, q′) is the solution
we are looking for. The reasoning is similar to the previous one.
• – Let ((σ, q), Eq,γ,ω .E F ) be in RE and (σ, q) τ−→E (σ′, q′). We should
prove that exists a (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ s.t. Eq,γ,ω .E F
τ−→ (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′
and ((σ′, q′), (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′) ∈ RE . We have, by second rule of .E
and by the definition of Eq,γ,ω , that if Eq,γ,ω −a−→ Eq′,γ,ω and F a−→ F ′
then Eq,γ,ω .E F
τ−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′. Now F ′ σ7→
′
. So (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ is
Eq
′,γ,ω .E F
′ and ((σ′, q′), Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′) ∈ RE trivially.
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– Let (Eq,γ,ω .E F, (σ, q)) be in RE and Eq,ω .E F τ−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′. We
should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) τ−→e (σ, q)′ and (Eq,γ,ω .E
F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RE For the rule E-StepS we have that (σ′, q′) is the solution
we are looking for. The reasoning is similar to the previous one.
• – Let ((σ, q), Eq,γ,ω .E F ) be in RE and (σ, q) b−→E (σ, q′). We should
prove that exists a (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ s.t. Eq,γ,ω .E F
b−→ (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′
and ((σ, q′), (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′) ∈ RE . We have, by third rule of .E and by
the definition of Eq,γ,ω that if Eq,γ,ω 6 a−→ Eq′,γ,ω , Eq,γ,ω +a.b−→ Eq′,γ,ω
and F a−→ F ′ then Eq,γ,ω .E F b−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F . So (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ is
Eq
′,γ,ω .E F and ((σ, q′), Eq
′,γ,ω .E F ) ∈ RE trivially.
– Let (Eq,γ,ω .E F, (σ, q)) be in RE and Eq,γ,ω .E F b−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F .
We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) b−→ (σ, q)′ and (Eq′,γ .E
F, (σ, q)′) ∈ RE . For the rule E-Ins we have that (σ, q′) is the solution we
are looking for. The reasoning is similar to the previous one.
2
Proposition 5 For every K ∈ {truncation, suppression, insertion, edit} the follow-
ing relation holds
Y .K X ¹ Y [fK]
where fK is a relabeling function definition of which depend on K.
In order to prove this proposition we prove the following four lemmas. The proof
of the proposition comes from these.
Lemma 4 The following relation holds
Y .T X ¹ Y [fT ] (5)
where fT is the identity function.
Proof: We prove that the following relation is a weak simulation.
ST = {(E .T F,E[fT ])|E,F ∈ E}
Note that being fT the identity function we could omit it without loss of generality.
Assume that E .T F
a→ E′ .T F ′ with the additional hypothesis that F a→ F ′ then,
by the rule of .T we have that E
a⇒ E′ and, obviously, (E′ .T F ′, E′) ∈ ST . 2
Lemma 5 The following relation holds
Y .S X ¹ Y [fS ] (6)
where
fS(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Act
τ if a = −a
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Proof: We prove that the following relation is a weak simulation.
SS = {(E .S F,E[fS ])|E,F ∈ E}
There are two possible cases: the first one is when E .S F performs the action a. The
proof of this case is the same of the proof of lemma 4. If E .S F
τ−→ E′ .S F ′ means
that E −a−→ E′ and F perform an action a that E should not perform. Applying the
relabeling function fS to E we obtain E1 = E[fS ] s.t. E1
τ=⇒ E′1. where E′1 is
E′[fS ]. Hence (E′ .S F ′, E′1) ∈ SS . 2
Lemma 6 The following relation holds
Y .I X ¹ Y [fI ] (7)
where
fI(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Act
τ if a = +a
Proof: We prove that the following relation is a weak simulation.
SI = {(E .I F,E[fI ])|E,F ∈ E}
There are two possible cases: the first one is when E .I F performs the action a. The
proof of this case is the same of the proof of lemma 4. If E .I F
b−→ E′ .I F means
that E +a.b−→ E′ and F perform an action a that E should not perform in order to go
in the state E′. Applying the relabeling function fI to E we obtain E1 = E[fI ] s.t.
E1
b=⇒ E′1. where E′1 is E′[fI ]. Hence (E′ .I F ′, E′1) ∈ SI . 2
Lemma 7 The following relation holds
Y .E X ¹ Y [fE ] (8)
where
fE(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Act
τ if a ∈ {−a,+a}
Proof: We prove that the following relation is a weak simulation.
SE = {(E .E F,E[fE ])|E,F ∈ E}
There are three possible cases: the first one is when E .E F performs the action a.
The proof of this case is the same of the proof of lemma 4. the other two case is the
following:
• E.EF τ−→ E′.EF ′ we want to find a E′[fE ] s.t. E[fE ] τ−→ E[fE ]′. Referring
to the second rule of the edit automata we see that E .E F
τ−→ E′ .E F ′ when
E
−a−→ E′. Through the relabeling function fE we have E[fE ] τ−→ E′[fE ] and
(E′ .E F ′, E′[fE ]) ∈ SE .
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• E.E F b−→ E′ .E F we want to find a E′[fE ] s.t. E[fE ] b=⇒ E[fE ]′. Referring
to the last rule of edit automata we see thatE.EF
b−→ E′.EF whenE +a.b−→ E′.
Through the relabeling function fE we have E[fE ]
b=⇒ E′[fE ] and (E′ .E
F,E′[fE ]) ∈ SE
2 Proposition 6 Let E and F be two finite state processes and φ ∈ Frµ. If F ¹ E
then E |= φ⇒ F |= φ.
Proof : A translation from equational µ-calculus to modal µ-calculus is possible
[1]. So first of all we consider the modal formula associated with the given formula φ
then the proof may be divided in two part. Former we prove the proposition holds for
the formulae of modal µ-calculus without recursion operator, latter we extended the
results also to µX.φ and νX.φ.
The first part is very similar to the proof proposed by Stirling in [19] that is made
by induction on the structure of the formula φ. The base case is clear. For the inductive
step first suppose φ = φ1 ∧ φ2 and that the result holds for the components φ1 and φ2.
By the definition of satisfaction relation E |= φ iff E |= φ1 and E |= φ2. By inductive
hypothesis F |= φ1 and F |= φ2 then F |= φ. A similar argument justifies the case
φ = φ1 ∨ φ2. Next suppose φ = [a]φ1 and E |= φ. Therefore for any E′ s.t. E a⇒ E′
it follows that E′ |= φ1. Let F a→ F ′ we know that for some E′ there is the transition
E
a⇒ E′ and F ′ ¹ E′, so by inductive hypothesis F ′ |= φ1 and so F |= φ. Now we
have to prove that if φ = µX.φ1 or φ = νX.φ1 the proposition holds. Referring to the
definition of minimum and maximum fixed point we can consider these as inductive
limit (the union) of formulae like µXα.φ1, where µX0.φ1 = F and µXα+1.φ1 =
φ1[µXα.φ1/X], and νXα.φ1 where νX0.φ1 = T and νXα+1.φ1 = φ1[νXα.φ1/X].
In this way E |= µX.φ1 iff E |= µXα.φ1 for some α iff E |=
∨
α(µX
α.φ1) and
E |= νX.φ1 iff E |= νXα.φ1 for all α iff E |=
∧
α(νX
α.φ1). In the former case we
have a sequence of disjunction and in the latter we have a sequence of conjunction. We
can apply again the argument of the first part of the proof. 2
Proposition 7: Given a formula φ ∈ ∀∧µC, a maximal deterministic model E of
this formula exists.
In order to prove this proposition we introduce the following notions.
B.1 Canonical structure
The vocabulary of the µ-calculus is extended by a countable set DCons of fresh sym-
bols that will be referred to as definition constant and usually denoted U , V, · · · (see
[21]). These new symbols are now allowed to appear positively in formulae, like propo-
sitional variables. A definition list is a finite sequence of equations: D = ((U1 =
σ1X.α1(X)), · · · , (Un = σnX.αn(X))whereU1, · · · , Un ∈ DCons and σiX.αi(X)
is a formula such that all definition constants appearing in αi are among U1, · · · , Ui−1.
We assume that Ui 6= Uj and αi 6= αj for i 6= j. If i < j then Ui is said to be older
than Uj .
A tableau sequent is a pair (Γ,D) where D is a definition list and Γ is a finite set
of formulae such that the only constants that occur in them are those from D. We will
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denote (Γ,D) by Γ `D.
A tableau axiom is a sequent Γ `D such that some formula and its negation occurs
in Γ.
Below we present the set of rules for constructing tableau. Let S be the following
set of tableau rules:
(and) α ∧ β,Γ `D
α, β,Γ `D
(or) α ∨ β,Γ `D
α,Γ `D β,Γ `D
(cons) U,Γ `D
αU,Γ `D whenever (U = σX.α(X)) ∈ D
(µ) µX.α(X),Γ `D
U,Γ `D whenever (U = µX.α(X)) ∈ D
(ν) νX.α(X),Γ `D
U,Γ `D whenever (U = νX.α(X)) ∈ D
(all 〈〉) Γ `D{α, {β : [a]β ∈ Γ} `D : 〈a〉α ∈ Γ}
where in the last rule each formula in Γ is a propositional constant, a variable, a nega-
tion of one of them or a formula of the form 〈b〉β or [b]β for some action b and a
formula β.
Observe that each rule, except (or) or (all 〈〉), has exactly one premise.
The system Smod is obtained from S by replacing the rule (or) by two rules (orleft)
and (orright) defined in the obvious way.
The system Sref is obtained from S by replacing the rule (all〈〉) by the rule
(〈〉) 〈a〉α,Γ `D
α, {β : [a]β ∈ Γ} `D with the same restrictions on formulae in Γ as in the case
of (all〈〉) rule.
Definition 8 Given a positive guarded formula φ, a tableau for φ is any labeled tree
〈K,L〉, where K is a tree and L a labeling function, such that
1. the root of K is labeled with φ `D where D is the definition list of φ;
2. if L is a tableau axiom then n is a leaf of K;
3. if L(n) is not an axiom then the sons of n inK are created and labeled according
to the rules of the system S .
A quasi-model of φ is defined in a similar way to tableau, except the system Smod is
used instead of S and we impose the additional requirement that no leaf is labeled by
a tableau axiom. A quasi-refutation of φ is defined in a similar way to tableau, except
the system Sref is used instead of S and we impose the additional requirement that
every leaf is labeled by a tableau axiom.
Let P = (v1, v2, · · · ) be a path in the tree K. A trace T r on the path P is any
sequence of formulas {αi}i∈I such that αi ∈ L(vi) and αi+1 is either αi, if formula
αi was not reduced by the rule applied in vi, or otherwise αi+1 is one of the formulae
obtained by applying the rule to αi.
A constant U regenerates on the trace T r if for some i, ai = U and ai+1 = α(U)
where (U = σX.α(X)) ∈ D. The trace T r is called a ν-trace iff it is finite and does
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not end with a tableau axiom, or if the oldest constant in the definition list D which
is regenerated infinitely often on T r is a ν-constant. Otherwise the trace is called a
µ-trace.
Definition 9 A quasi model PM is called pre-model iff any trace on any path of PM
is a ν-trace.
A quasi-refutation of φ is called a refutation of φ iff on every path of there exists a
µ-trace.
Definition 10 Given a pre-model PM, the canonical structure for PM is a structure
M = 〈SM, RM, ρM〉 such that
1. SM is the set of all nodes of PM which are either leaves or to which (all〈〉) rule
was applied. For any node n of PM we will denote by sn the closest descendant
of n belonging to SM.
2. (s, s′) ∈ RM(a) iff there is a son n of s with sn = s′, such that L(n) was
obtained from L(s) by reducing a formula of the form 〈a〉α.
3. ρM(p) = {s : p occurs in the sequent L(s)}.
In the following we assume pre-models (and so canonical models) that are built
using quasi-models where the (orleft) is applied only if the (orright) fails to provide a
pre-model. With this assumption, since we will apply the canonical model only to one
kind of formula with disjunction, we may control which branch will be followed and
so the kind of canonical model generated.
Proposition 9 ([21]) If there exists a pre-model PM for a positive guarded sentence
φ then φ is satisfiable in the canonical structure for PM.
B.2 Proof of proposition 7
Lemma 8 Let φ ∈ ∀∧µC and ψ = X where X =ν
∧
α∈Act([α]F ∨ (〈α〉X ∧ [α]X)).
If φ is satisfiable then φ ∧ ψ is satisfiable.
Proof : The formula X =ν
∧
α∈Act([α]F ∨ (〈α〉X ∧ [α]X)) or its equivalent formu-
lation in modal µ−calculus νX.∧α∈Act([α]F ∨ (〈α〉X ∧ [α]X)) holds in every state
(i.e. it is a tautology) and so if E is a model of φ then E is also a model for ψ. To prove
that ψ is a tautology one can build a refutation for its negation using the Sref tableaux.
2
Lemma 9 Let E′ |= φ with φ ∈ ∀∧µC. Then the canonical model E of φ∧ ψ, is such
that E′ ¹ E.
Proof : We define the following relation:
R = {(E′, E)|∃φ,E′ |= φ ∈ ∀∧µC and E |= φ ∧ ψ
and E is the canonical structure for φ ∧ ψ}
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and prove that R is a simulation.
Suppose that E′ α−→ E′1, E′ |= φ and E′1 |= φ′ for some φ′ ∈ ∀∧µC. As a matter
of fact, due to the specific assumptions we have on φ, we may rewrite it in an equivalent
form φ∗ as ∧α∈Act[α]φα. Thus φ′ would be equivalent to φα and φα is not equivalent
to F (since it has a model E′).
In the canonical model (that must exist since φ ∧ ψ is satisfiable) the possibility
is to choose the (orright) and so E will do an α action reaching another state that is
a model for ψ and is also a model for φα, see rule all in the tableaux construction.
As a matter of fact the initial tableaux contruction exactly puts φ in the desired format
before applying the reduction. 2
Proof of proposition 7: It is necessary to prove that such E is a model for φ, that
it is a maximal model and that it is a deterministic process. By Lemma A.1 it follows
that E is a model for φ. Being E the canonical structure, it is easy to note that it is
deterministic because it performs only one action 〈 〉 and so every rule that permits to
construct it has only a premise (see rule all). The maximality follows from Lemma
A.2.
2
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